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ABSOLUTE, RESTRICTIVE, OR SOMETHING MORE: DID
BEIJING CHOOSE THE RIGHT TYPE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR HONG KONG?
INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997 when it was returned to China.1
Today, Hong Kong remains a common law jurisdiction, distinct from
Mainland China,2 and enjoys a high degree of autonomy.3 Before 1997, Hong
Kong followed the British doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity, under
which a foreign sovereign is not immune from claims arising out of
commercial activities.4 China, however, has espoused the more traditional
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, under which a foreign sovereign is
always immune from suit, whether or not the claim arose from commercial
activities.5
In 2008, an American vulture fund6 sued the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (the “DRC”) in Hong Kong, seeking enforcement of arbitral awards by
garnishing mining-right fees that certain state-owned Chinese companies owed
to the DRC.7 The national government in Beijing intervened heavily in the
Congo cases,8 effectively forcing Hong Kong to abandon its common law
restrictive doctrine of immunity and shift to China’s more traditional absolute

1

IAN DOBINSON & DEREK ROEBUCK, INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN THE HONG KONG SAR 1 (2d ed. 2001).
“Mainland China” is a geographical term referring to the People’s Republic of China, minus Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Macau. See Hong Xue, The Voice of China: A Story of Chinese-Character Domain Names,
12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 559, 575 (2004).
3 See DOBINSON & ROEBUCK, supra note 1, at 1–3.
4 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System paras. 62,
502–12 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo I), [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410,
para. 37 (C.F.I.) (H.K.); RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE
CASE OF HONG KONG 65 (1997).
5 See, e.g., Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 890–91 (5th Cir. 1998);
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986); Midland Inv. Co. v. Bank of
Commc’ns [1956] 40 H.K.L.R. 42, 43 (H.C.); Civil Air Transp. Inc. v. Chennault, [1950] 34 H.K.L.R. 358,
360 (H.C.).
6 A vulture fund is a professional plaintiff that buys defaulted sovereign debts owed by developing
countries at a deep discount on the secondary sovereign debt market, and then sues the sovereign debtor,
seeking recovery of the face value of the debt plus interest. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
7 Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D. para. 4.
8 See, e.g., id. paras. 31, 55.
2
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sovereign immunity doctrine.9 Part III of this Comment argues that Beijing
was wrong to require Hong Kong to regress from the restrictive to the absolute
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Further, the Congo cases were more than just suits against a foreign
sovereign defendant—they were also suits filed by a vulture fund, a highly
controversial species of plaintiff.10 Part IV of this Comment proposes a
solution to the problem of vulture-fund suits that does not involve shifting to
the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Congo cases were brought in Hong Kong by a vulture fund plaintiff,
against a sovereign defendant that claimed immunity. The Chinese government
intervened heavily.11 The “core question of law” was whether Hong Kong
should retain the British restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity or shift to
Mainland China’s absolute doctrine.12 This Part of the Comment will provide
background information on the following: (A) the distinction between absolute
and restrictive sovereign immunity; (B) restrictive sovereign immunity in
Hong Kong before it was handed over to China; (C) the statutory vacuum after
Hong Kong’s return to China; (D) China’s adherence to absolute immunity;
and (E) vulture funds’ challenge to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
A. From Absolute to Restrictive Sovereign Immunity
Traditionally in public international law, the government of one sovereign
country, together with its agents and instrumentalities, enjoyed absolute
sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of another sovereign
country.13After the Second World War, as the role of the state changed, more
and more countries shifted to a new “restrictive” doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which carved out exceptions to claims of immunization from suit in

9 See Interpretation of Paragraph 1, Article 13 & Article 19 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong (2011) Cap. 2114, BLIS (requiring Hong Kong to defer to the People’s
Government as to rules and policies on state immunity) [hereinafter Interpretation of Article 13].
10 See, e.g., Congo III, [2011] Legal Reference System (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
11 See, e.g., Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 31, 55.
12 Congo III, [2011] Legal Reference System para. 2.
13 See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 197–98 (3d ed. 2010)
(explaining that a state’s absolute immunity from suit in the domestic courts of another country arose in the
early 19th century).

DING GALLEYSPROOFS2

2012]

ABSOLUTE, RESTRICTIVE, OR SOMETHING MORE

5/28/2013 1:30 PM

999

foreign courts.14 Under a common form of restrictive sovereign immunity,
foreign sovereign entities do not enjoy immunity from claims arising out of
commercial activities.15
B. Restrictive Sovereign Immunity in Hong Before 1997
Before its return to China in 1997, Hong Kong followed the British
restrictive approach and did not extend sovereign immunity to commercial
transactions.16 In fact, Hong Kong was one of the earliest common law
jurisdictions to adopt the restrictive rule of sovereign immunity.17 As early as
1956, Hong Kong limited sovereign immunity to acts for “public use[s],” and
placed the burden of proof on the sovereign defendant claiming immunity.18 In
Midland Investment, a British corporate plaintiff sued the Bank of
Communications of Shanghai for surrendering securities in its account to the
Chinese government after the Communists took over Shanghai.19 The
defendant, an instrumentality of China, challenged the jurisdiction of the court
in Hong Kong because the action impleaded the sovereign state of China.20
Finding that the defendant failed to adduce “evidence of dedication to public
uses,” the judge ruled not to accord sovereign immunity to China.21
In 1975, restrictive sovereign immunity was still a novelty in English
Law.22 But the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which was then Hong
Kong’s court of last resort,23 affirmed the application of restrictive sovereign

14

Id.
See generally id. at 199 (stating that, beginning after the Second World War, courts in Europe and the
United States began to make exceptions to absolute sovereign immunity when the State engaged in
commercial activities).
16 Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 62, 502; Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D para. 37; MUSHKAT, supra
note 4, at 65.
17 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 132 (surveying the adoption of the restrictive approach by a
number of common law jurisdictions, and noting that “Hong Kong comes early in that list”) (citing Midland
Inv. Co. v. Bank of Commc’ns [1956] 40 H.K.L.R. 42 (H.C.)).
18 Midland Inv. Co. 40 H.K.L.R. at 48 (“In my view . . . it is necessary for the foreign sovereign, if he
wishes to discharge the onus of satisfying the court that he is entitled to sovereign immunity . . . to produce
satisfactory evidence that the property seized is dedicated or destined to public use.”)
19 Id. at 42.
20 Id. at 43, 45.
21 Id. at 49.
22 See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 at 533 (Eng.); see also Playa
Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board ) v. I Congreso del Partido (Owners), [1983] A.C. 244 (H.L.)
278 (Lord Bridge of Harwich) (appeal taken from Eng.).
23 See DOBINSON & ROEBUCK, supra note 1, at 84.
15
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immunity in Hong Kong.24 In The Philippine Admiral, the Republic of the
Philippines claimed sovereign immunity25 from in rem actions against a
commercial trading vessel that was operated by private charterers but was
owned by the Filipino government.26 The Privy Council recognized a growing
prevalence around the world of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,27
and found it “more consonant with justice” than the absolute theory.28
Therefore, the Privy Council decided to apply the restrictive theory to the in
rem actions at bar,29 while leaving the question of sovereign immunity
regarding in personam actions “open to the House of Lords to decide,” and
expecting the House to reach the same restrictive conclusion.30
The House of Lords met that expectation in I Congreso del Partido,31 in
which their Lordships abolished the in rem versus in personam distinction and
applied the restrictive doctrine across-the-board.32 In 1973, after a military
coup in Chile,33 the Cuban government severed diplomatic ties with Chile and
24 Philippine Admiral (Owners) v. Wallem Shipping (H.K.) Ltd. (The Philippine Admiral), [1977] A.C.
373 (P.C.) 374 (appeal taken from H.K.), aff’g Wallem Shipping (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners of the Ship
“Philippine Admiral,” [1974] H.K.L.R. 111 (C.A.).
25 The Philippine Admiral, [1977] A.C. at 376.
26 Id. at 386–89.
27 Id. at 397 (“There is no doubt . . . that since the Second World War there has been . . . a movement
away from the absolute theory of sovereign immunity . . . towards a more restrictive theory.”).
28 Id. at 403.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 402–03. Before the issue of restrictive immunity came up in the House of Lords, it went to the
Court of Appeal of England, which ruled to adopt the restrictive approach for England. Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 at 558 (Eng.). The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning,
quoted the relevant passage from The Philippine Admiral, and criticized the Privy Council for drawing a
useless distinction between in rem and in personam actions. Id. at 556–57 (quoting The Philippine Admiral,
A.C. at 373). Trendtex Trading was an English case, and was never appealed to the House of Lords. Playa
Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board ) v. I Congreso del Partido (Owners), [1983] 1 A.C. 244
(H.L.) 261 (appeal taken from Eng.). The restrictive approach that Trendtex Trading established was, however,
codified by Parliament a year later in 1978. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
31 The fact that this was a House of Lords decision taken on appeal not from Hong Kong should not
diminish its authority in colonial Hong Kong in any significant way. Generally, House of Lords decisions had
the same highly persuasive authority in Hong Kong as Privy Council decisions on non-Hong Kong appeals,
which “was very great unless the decision was in a field where local circumstances made it appropriate for
Hong Kong to develop along different lines.” Solicitor (24/07) v. Law Soc’y of H.K. [2008] 11 H.K.C.F.A.R.
117, 133 para. 15 (C.F.A.); see also De Lasala v. De Lasala, [1980] A.C. 546 (P.C.) 558 (appeal taken from
H.K.) (“[L]ooked at realistically [the House of Lords’] decisions on [statutory interpretation] will have the
same practical effect as if they were strictly binding . . . .” (emphasis added)); Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu
Chong Hing Bank, [1986] 1 A.C. 80 (P.C.) 108 (appeal taken from H.K.) (“Once it is accepted, as in this case
it is, that the applicable law is English, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee will follow a House of
Lords’ decision which covers the point in issue.”).
32 I Congreso del Partido, 1 A.C. at 261.
33 Id. at 259, 277.
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instructed the defendants, state-owned Cuban corporations, not to deliver sugar
ordered by a Chilean importer.34 When the defendants bought a new trading
vessel from a shipyard in England in 1975, the Chilean company filed a
number of claims in an English court both in rem against the new ship, and in
personam against the defendants.35 Because these events occurred between
1973 and 1975, the common law of that time was in question, and later statutes
were not applied retroactively.36 Although their Lordships were divided on the
outcome of the case,37 they unanimously affirmed the move toward restrictive
sovereign immunity made in The Philippine Admiral, and extended it to in
personam actions.38
The common law of Hong Kong recognized the restrictive rule in 1956 at
the earliest.39 By 1981, when I Congreso del Partido was decided in the House
of Lords, it was unambiguous that the restrictive rule of sovereign immunity
had been cemented in the common law of Hong Kong by the highest
authority.40

34

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 257–58.
36 Id. at 260.
37 Id. at 276.
38 Id. at 261 (Lord Wilberforce) (“I would unhesitatingly affirm as part of English law the advance made
by The Philippine Admiral [1977] A.C. 373 with the reservation that the decision was perhaps unnecessarily
restrictive in, apparently, confining the departure made to actions in rem.”); id. at 272 (Lord Diplock) (“I agree
broadly with [Lord Wilberforce’s] analysis of the “restrictive” theory . . . .”); id. at 276 (Lord Edmund-Davies)
(“I respectfully concur.”); id. at 277 (Lord Keith of Kinkel) (“I find myself in full agreement with the opinion
expressed by my noble and learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, regarding the principles which at the material
time represented the law of England in the field of sovereign immunity.”); id. at 278 (Lord Bridge of Harwich)
(“I would not possibly hope to emulate, let alone improve upon, the penetrating analysis of the relevant
principles, derived from the welter of material put before us, which is set out in the speech of my noble and
learned friend, Lord Wilberforce, and with which I broadly agree.”).
39 See, e.g., Congo III, [2011] Legal Reference System para. 94 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). (citing Midland Inv. Co.
v. Bank of Commc’ns [1956] 40 H.K.L.R. 42, 48 (H.C.)); MUSHKAT, supra note 4, at 65 (citing Midland Inv.
Co., 40 H.K.L.R. at 48).
40 Even the majority in Congo III, which disregarded the restrictive rule at common law and applied
absolute immunity, Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 411, conceded that “[i]n 1981, the House of
Lords confirmed the adoption of the restrictive immunity theory as a matter of common law in I Congreso del
Partido . . . .” Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 221.
35
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C. The Statutory Vacuum in Hong Kong After 1997
In 1978, Parliament codified the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity
in the State Immunity Act (the “SIA”),41 which was extended to Hong Kong in
1979.42 Therefore, “on 30 June 1997, the theory of state immunity applied by
the Hong Kong courts, whether under the SIA 1978 or on the basis of some
underlying doctrine of common law, was a restrictive theory, recognizing a
commercial exception to what was otherwise an absolute immunity.”43
The SIA, however, ceased to have effect in Hong Kong when the territory
was returned to China on July 1, 1997,44 leaving behind a “statutory
vacuum.”45 No local ordinance in Hong Kong or national legislation in China
was ever passed on sovereign immunity to fill this vacuum.46
Legislative history—or lack of legislative history—suggests that the lapse
of the SIA was not entirely inadvertent.47 Before the United Kingdom returned
governance of Hong Kong to China, the British and the Chinese governments
negotiated to “localise” parts of the SIA (including a provision providing a
commercial exception to sovereign immunity)48 by enacting a local Hong
Kong ordinance.49 But the ordinance was never finished, allegedly “because of
the [Chinese government]’s sovereignty concerns.”50 As a result, the SIA
41 State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33, § 3 (U.K.); see Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 75 (“[T]he
doctrine of restrictive immunity . . . was ‘codified and consolidated’ by the SIA.” (quoting VAUGHAN LOWE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (2007))).
42 State Immunity (Overseas Territories) Order, 1979, S.I. 1979/458, ¶ 2; see Congo III, Legal Reference
System para. 220; FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 252
(C.A.) (H.K.); Congo I, [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410, para. 41 (C.F.I.).
43 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 222.
44 Id.
45 Congo II, H.K.L.R.D. para. 252.
46 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 367, 370; see Dahai Qi, State Immunity, China and Its
Shifting Position, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 307, 316–17 (2008) (examining and ruling out a number of suspect
Chinese statutes that might be marginally relevant to sovereign immunity, and concluding that, “[o]wing to the
scarcity of domestic legislation both substantively and procedurally on State immunity, it is questionable that
Chinese People’s Courts are capable of applying the international law principle of State immunity in either
absolute or restrictive approach to an actual case.”).
47 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 371.
48 Constitutional Affairs Comm., Localisation of Laws, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF H.K. (Dec. 16, 1996),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/panels/ca/papers/xx1612x3.htm (“The most important provision in
the [SIA] is that a State will not be immune in respect of proceedings in relation to commercial dealings.”),
available at.
49 Id. (“The Act will cease to have effect in Hong Kong as from 1 July 1997 and hence the need for a
localised Bill.”).
50 Memorandum from Sec’y for Constitutional Affairs to the H.K. Legislative Council Panel on
Constitutional Affairs para. 4(a) (June 12, 1997), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/library/
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expired, along with half of the 300 or so British enactments that were
applicable to Hong Kong before 1997.51
This legislative history might suggest that the Chinese government
intended to let the SIA expire.52 But to infer purpose or intent from legislative
inaction is almost always a tricky business.53 In the Congo cases, specific
factors caution against drawing any conclusion on Chinese intent to phase out
restrictive immunity in Hong Kong. To begin with, the SIA was not unique in
its position as an expired British statute. As mentioned above, the group of
British and Chinese officials in charge of “localization” allowed half of all the
then-applicable British statutes to lapse.54 Moreover, if the failure to localize
the British codification of the restrictive approach indicated intent to revert
Hong Kong to the absolute approach, the same logic could also lead to the
converse conclusion; that is, the failure to enact a Chinese codification of the
absolute approach indicated intent to preserve the restrictive approach.55 In any
event, a mere mention of Chinese “sovereignty concerns” in the records cannot
be very informative. There was simply no statute on point.56 Thus, the
legislative history of the SIA offers little guidance, except a conclusion that the
statutes were completely quiet on the question of whether Hong Kong followed
the restrictive or the absolute approach after 1997.57
On the other hand, at common law, the settled expectation was that the
demise of the SIA would bring back to life the pre-SIA common law, which
had by then adopted the restrictive rule.58 Writing on the eve of Hong Kong’s
index.html (follow “Advanced Search” hyperlink; then follow “Search by LegCo Paper Number” hyperlink;
type “CB(2)2680/96-97” into search field; then follow “CB(2)2680/96-97” hyperlink; then follow
“CB(2)2680/96-97 (English Version) hyperlink). .
51 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 371(a).
52 The majority in Congo III concluded unequivocally that the Chinese government deliberately
prevented the continued application of the restrictive rule in Hong Kong by frustrating a British effort to
localize of the SIA. Id. para. 372 (“It is therefore clear that the CPG specifically decided that there should not
be legislation in [Hong Kong] to import the commercial exception to absolute immunity provided for under the
SIA 1978.”). A deliberate plan to let the SIA go was also suggested in the letters from the Commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Id. para. 463 (Mortimer, J., dissenting).
53 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988)(explaining the difficulties courts have encountered when confronted with legislative inaction and
arguing that using legislative inaction as legislative history is problematic from a normative perspective.).
54 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 371(a).
55 The latter conclusion was suspected in the majority opinion in the Court of Appeal. See Congo II,
[2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 121 (C.A.) (H.K.) (“[W]ere it intended that the courts of Hong Kong should
apply the [absolute] . . . theory of sovereign immunity, that intention would be given effect by legislation.”).
56 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
57 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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reunification with Mainland China, Professor Mushkat opined, “It may be
assumed that [Hong Kong] judges will continue to follow the ‘restrictive
approach’ to state immunity as incorporated in the common law, although this
may give rise to some doctrinal conflicts with their Mainland counterparts.”59
Clearly, observers anticipated conflicts with Chinese law and policy from the
outset.
D. Mainland China’s Adherence to Absolute Sovereign Immunity
One can ascertain China’s position on sovereign immunity through works
by commentators and the news media, but it is more straightforward to start
with a look at representations made by the Chinese government itself on this
matter. When listed as defendants in commercial lawsuits in foreign courts,
sovereign entities of the People’s Republic of China have often vigorously
argued for the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that China must be
immune from suit even when a claim arises out of purely commercial
activities.60
Perhaps in keeping with its strong adherence to the absolutist doctrine, the
Chinese government appears to prefer extrajudicial and diplomatic channels to
communicate its stance on absolute sovereign immunity. For instance, when a
U.S. federal district court tried Morris v. People’s Republic of China, the
Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. sent a memorandum (the “Embassy
Memo”) to the U.S. Department of State.61 The Embassy Memo reiterated
China’s adherence to the absolutist view, stating, “[T]he Chinese side has
declared a solemn position on sovereign immunity to the US side on many
occasions.”62 Such diplomatic communications tend to be difficult to get hold
of, making it almost impossible to verify their accuracy.63 Any exhaustive
59

MUSHKAT, supra note 4, at 66 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 890–91 (5th Cir. 1998);
Jackson v. People’s Republic China , 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986); Midland Inv. Co. v. Bank of
Commc’ns, [1956] 40 H.K.L.R. 42 (H.C.); Civil Air Transp. Inc., [1950] 34 H.K.L.R. 358 (H.C.) (granting
sovereign immunity to the People’s Republic of China in a dispute over airplane sales, even though the PRC
was not a party).
61 Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 478 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see Congo II, [2010] 2
H.K.L.R.D. 66 para. 96 (C.A.) (H.K.).
62 Congo II, [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 96 (C.A.) (H.K.) (emphasis added) (quoting Letter from the
Office of the Comm’r of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in the H.K. Special Admin. Region, to the
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of the H.K. Gov’t (May 21, 2009)).
63 After an extensive search to the best of this author’s ability, only one diplomatic document of this kind
was unearthed. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, People’s Republic of China: Aide Memoire of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 75, 81 (1983).
60
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survey of such Chinese assertions of absolute sovereign immunity through
diplomatic channels would certainly be difficult.64 But the Congo II court,
which reviewed the Embassy Memo and quoted the above statement, found it
“undoubtedly correct,” and took it at face value.65
It appears to be routine for Chinese diplomats to protest to the executive
branch of the foreign government whenever China is sued in a foreign court.66
In contrast, China does not extend the benefit of such diplomatic exchanges to
the court in which the case is being tried. For example, the U.S. district court in
Morris did not review the Embassy Memo.67 Not a single word of the Embassy
Memo made it into the district court’s judgment in that case,68 nor was there
any mention in the court’s opinion of any Chinese objection to the court’s
application of the restrictive approach as codified in U.S. statutes.69
Nonetheless, in a few earlier cases, China and its instrumentalities did
argue in court for absolute immunity.70 One such example is Jackson v.
People’s Republic of China, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit heard China’s absolutist position on sovereign immunity.71 In this 1986
case, American plaintiffs sued the communist Chinese government for
payments on bonds issued by the pre-revolution imperial Chinese
government.72 China argued that it had maintained the absolute doctrine as a
fundamental part of its sovereignty; that only a handful of developed countries
had adopted the restrictive rule; and that the restrictive rule was not applicable
to those developing countries that did not agree to it, such as China.73 The
court also quoted a statement of interest filed by the United States,74 which
read in relevant part, “China’s adherence to [the absolute] principle results, in
part, from its adverse experience with extraterritorial laws and jurisdiction of
64 See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection and
Predictability?, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 615, 679 n.309 (1993) (“There have been few reported cases of U.S.
nationals suing the Chinese government.”).
65 Congo II, 2 H.K.L.R.D. para. 96.
66 See, e.g., Jill A. Sgro, Comment, China’s Stance on Sovereign Immunity: A Critical Perspective on
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101, 127–28 (1983) (describing Scott v.
People’s Republic of China, No. CA3-79-0836-D (N.D. Tex. filed June 29, 1979)).
67 See Morris v. People’s Republic China, 478 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y 2007).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Midland Inv. Co. v. Bank of Commc’ns, [1956] 40 H.K.L.R. 42, 43, 45 (H.C.); see also
supra text accompanying note 20.
71 Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986).
72 Id. at 1491–92.
73 Id. at 1494.
74 Id.
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western powers [within China] in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.”75 The court did not rule on these arguments about absolute
immunity, and affirmed the dismissal of the case on other grounds.76
China has a reputation for adamant insistence on absolute sovereign
immunity among legal commentators. A cursory reading of a standard
international law textbook77 would reveal that China is typically considered
one of the last holdouts for the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.78 In
his CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, Professor D.J. Harris
wrote, “[O]nly China, India and a small number of developing states now
follow the absolute immunity approach.”79 Other commentators, including
native Chinese scholars, have reached similar conclusions.80 Professor Roda
Mushkat remarked in 1997 that “China’s practice relating to sovereign
immunity . . . reflects a determined adherence to the doctrine of absolute
immunity.”81
Considering China’s position as discussed in this Part, it is difficult to
question the forcefulness and vigor with which China asserts its support for the
absolute doctrine. However, commentators have expressed serious doubts as to
whether China’s adherence to the absolute doctrine has persisted.82 Part III.B
of this Comment examines the persistency question in detail and explains the
importance of persistency.
One important recent development that relates to persistency is China’s
signing of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of

75 Id. See generally Sgro, supra note 66, at 119–22 (explaining the motives behind China’s staunch
adherence to the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity).
76 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1494, 1499.
77 See, e.g., D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2004).
78 Id. at 307.
79 Id. But cf. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 n.31 (6th ed. 2003)
(listing China along with fourteen other countries as still accepting the principle of absolute sovereign
immunity). Sir Ian’s treatise appears outdated, as it included in that list now-defunct countries such as
Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Id.
80 See, e.g., Qi, supra note 46, at 307 (“China has been regarded as one of the staunchest supporters of
the principle of absolute immunity of State and its property from the jurisdiction of other States.”); Sgro, supra
note 66, at 101(stating that “[T]he P.R.C. adheres to the traditional ‘absolute’ doctrine of sovereign
immunity . . . .”); cf. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 760–61 (2003) (“Evidence suggests that even the
People’s Republic of China, a staunch supporter of absolute immunity, may be moderating its position.”).
81 MUSHKAT, supra note 4, at 66.
82 See infra notes 201, 204–05 and accompanying text.
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States and Their Property (the “UN Convention”).83 The UN Convention
codified the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity,84 which China
ostensibly opposed.85 What is more startling is that, apart from the regular
business-transaction exception, this Convention provides several additional
exceptions to sovereign immunity. These exceptions include an exception for
arbitral agreements,86 which, as Part II.A shows, is squarely on point for the
Congo cases.87 Thus, by the stroke of a pen, China put itself on the cutting
edge of restricting sovereign immunity. This signing was even more out-ofcharacter for China, considering the small number of countries that signed the
UN Convention.88 As of October 13, 2012, there were only thirty-one
signatories and accessions to the UN Convention.89 A mere eight out of these
thirty-one countries have ratified it,90 and the UN Convention requires deposits
of instruments of ratification by thirty nations to enter into force.91 It will take
years, perhaps even decades, for this Convention to come into force.92 It will
probably take even longer for China, one of the most determined absolutist
holdouts, to ratify this Convention. Nonetheless, under the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties, China has an obligation “to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose” of the UN Convention, as it has “signed
the treaty,” but has not “made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty.”93

83 1 UNITED NATIONS, United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 1 APRIL
2009, at 142, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009). [hereinafter Status of United
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property].
84 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 arts. 10–17 (Dec. 2, 2004) (not yet in force).
85 See Qi, supra note 46, at 307 (noting that while China has historically supported absolute immunity, its
signature on the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property may indicate it is
shifting toward the restrictive approach).
86 G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 84, art. 17.
87 See infra notes 114–21 and accompanying text.
88 See Status of United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
supra note 83, at 142.
89 U.N. Treaty Collection, Status: United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en (last
visited Oct. 13, 2012).
90 Id.
91 G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 84, art. 30.
92 See Status of United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
supra note 83, at 142.
93 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

DING GALLEYSPROOFS2

1008

5/28/2013 1:30 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

E. The Rise of the Vultures
Outside Hong Kong and Mainland China, a new challenge to sovereign
immunity emerged in the early 1980s in the form of vulture funds. Vulture
funds are a novel and controversial species of professional plaintiff that
pursues claims against foreign sovereigns.94 One example of this new species
in the legal fauna later brought the Congo cases to Hong Kong.95 Vulture funds
tend to describe themselves in euphemistic and innocent-sounding terms, such
as investors “in problematic emerging market[s]”96 who specialize in
“uncovering,
investigating,
and
managing
alternate
investment
opportunities . . . .”97 Politicians such as Gordon Brown have described the
actions of vulture funds in much stronger language: “We particularly condemn
the perversity where Vulture Funds purchase debt at a reduced price and make
a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount owed—a
morally outrageous outcome.”98 In neutral terms, a vulture fund typically buys
defaulted sovereign debt owed by developing countries at a deep discount on
the secondary market, and then sues the sovereign debtor, seeking recovery of
the face value of the debt plus interest.99
Rich New York investors making a profit by suing poverty-ridden, debtladen developing nations may seem morally questionable.100 Beyond these
ethical issues, vulture funds also cause financial problems. By disrupting
international debt restructuring or debt relief efforts, vulture funds often inflict

94 See Oliver Jones, Let the Mainland Speak: A Positivist Take on the Congo Case, 41 H.K. L.J. 177, 178
(2011) (“The morality of DDFs is complex and controversial.”). See generally Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul
Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2010) (laying out the history of vulture funds and their litigation strategies in
phases).
95 See Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 18
(C.F.A.) (H.K.).
96 FG Hemisphere Assoc., LLC, FG Hemisphere, FGHEM (Oct. 15, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/
20070405091536/http://www.fghem.com/ (accessed by searching for FGHem.com in the Internet Archive
index).
97 FG Hemisphere Assoc., LLC, The Company, FGHEM (Oct. 9, 2007), http://web.archive.org/web/
20071009114226/http://www.fghem.com/ (accessed by searching FGHem.com in the Internet Archive index).
98 Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 94, at 53 n.30 (quoting Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the
Exchequer of the United Kingdom).
99 See id. at 49; see also Jones, supra note 94, at 178; Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran,
Declawing The Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 253, 254 (2003).
100 See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 94, at 53 (“Vulture funds tend to be secretive about their investors,
which is not surprising, given the political distastefulness of seeking to reap profits at the expense of indebted,
and typically very poor, countries and their citizenry.”).
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real damage on both the impoverished sovereign debtor and other more
conventional creditors, which sometimes include taxpayers in donor countries
in the West.101 Given the possibility of the prospect of a judicial decision
awarding the full value of sovereign debt, profit-seeking vulture funds often
refuse to agree to restructuring schemes.102 If the vulture fund becomes the last
creditor standing, it has the entire debtor country to itself, and could indirectly
profit from all the concessions, donations, and investments made to the debtor
by all the other creditors, donors, and investors.103 Such a monopoly on debt
collection could discourage other more generous and benevolent creditors from
going along with debt restructuring, drives up the interest rate for the debtor to
borrow in the future, and generally hinders the economic development of the
indebted country.104
As professional plaintiffs of sovereign debtors, vulture funds are committed
advocates for the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity, and are constantly
seeking to expand the scope of the exceptions to sovereign immunity.105 Partly
because of the vulture litigations over the past decades in creditor-friendly
jurisdictions, which included the United Kingdom,106 the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in such jurisdictions has been gradually eroding.107 This erosion
makes it easier for non-cooperative creditors, such as vulture funds, to succeed
in litigation against sovereign defendants, thus discouraging debt restructuring
and undermining the finances and economic development of poor, indebted
countries.108

101 See Elizabeth Broomfield, Note, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps on Recovery in
Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 475–77; see also GREG PALAST, VULTURES’
PICNIC 375–77 (2011) (detailing the vulture fund Hamsah’s obstructive role in an international effort to relieve
Liberia’s debt, and the harms Hamsah caused to all parties involved); Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 99, at
259–66 (discussing the problem of vulture fund holdouts that refuse to participate in sovereign debt
restructuring).
102 Broomfield, supra note 101, at 475.
103 See id. at 491–94 (discussing harms of the holdout problem in the context of the World Bank’s Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative); see also PALAST, supra note 101, at 376–77 (analyzing Hamsah’s
role in Liberia’s debt restructuring).
104 Broomfield, supra note 101, at 475–77.
105 See id. at 479–94 (laying out the gradual erosion of sovereign immunity since 1976); see also Ryan E.
Avery, Note, Out of the Desert and to the Oasis: Legislation on Predatory Debt Investing, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 267, 283–85 (2011) (describing the erosion of foreign sovereign immunity in the United
States as a result of vulture litigations).
106 Broomfield, supra note 101, at 486.
107 See id. at 479–83.
108 Id. at 494.
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II. SHIFT TO ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AFTER THE CONGO III CASE
This Part provides further background information specifically on the
Congo III case in Hong Kong. The Congo cases embodied every theme
covered so far in this Comment. The plaintiff was a vulture fund.109 The
defendant was a foreign sovereign who claimed immunity.110 The intervener
represented the Chinese national government in Beijing.111 The core question
of law, at least for the purpose of this Comment, was whether Hong Kong
should follow restrictive immunity or absolute immunity.112 The outcome was
that Hong Kong adopted absolute immunity under pressure from Beijing.113
A. Facts of the Congo Cases
The facts of the Congo cases are straightforward. An American vulture
fund named FG Hemisphere Associates sued the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in Hong Kong to enforce two arbitral awards.114 FG Hemisphere bought
the arbitral awards from Energoinvest DD, a Yugoslavian company that built
hydroelectric projects for the DRC back in the 1980s.115 Energoinvest never
received payment for those construction projects.116 In 2003, it won two
awards against the DRC in the arbitration courts of the International Chamber
of Commerce.117 After Energoinvest sold these awards to FG Hemisphere in
2004, the American vulture fund went after DRC assets around the world, and
sought enforcement of the arbitral awards against the DRC in several
countries.118
The DRC happened to have deals with the state-owned China Railway
Group Ltd. and its Hong Kong subsidiaries.119 Subject to approval by the
Chinese government, and under a series of cooperation agreements with the
Chinese government and a consortium of state-owned Chinese enterprises

109
110

Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 18.
FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo I), [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410, paras. 7, 14 (C.F.I.)

(H.K.).
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. paras. 9, 10, 14.
Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 2.
See Interpretation of Article 13 supra note 9.
Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 13; Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D paras. 1–4, 16.
Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 7, 14.
Id. para. 7.
Id. paras. 7–8, 13.
Id. paras. 14–15.
See Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D paras. 17–18.

DING GALLEYSPROOFS2

2012]

ABSOLUTE, RESTRICTIVE, OR SOMETHING MORE

5/28/2013 1:30 PM

1011

including China Railway, the DRC would receive entry fees, 120 among other
things,121 for granting the Chinese the right to exploit the DRC’s rich mineral
resources.122
B. Procedural History
In 2008, FG Hemisphere went to Hong Kong to enforce the arbitral awards
against the DRC by attempting to garnish part of the entry fees that China
Railway would pay through its subsidiaries in Hong Kong to the DRC.123 The
case went through the court system of Hong Kong, and eventually found its
way to the national legislature in Beijing.124
The Court of First Instance of the High Court of Hong Kong ruled in favor
of the DRC.125 FG Hemisphere appealed to a panel of three judges in the Court
of Appeal of the High Court. The Court split 2-1 in favor of FG Hemisphere,
and reversed the Court of First Instance’s decision.126 The DRC then appealed
to the Court of Final Appeal.127 In a provisional opinion, three of the five
justices on the panel held that the DRC was absolutely immune, and sought
interpretation of the Basic Law from the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress in Beijing.128 The two other justices dissented.129
The Standing Committee handed down a brief opinion affirming the
provisional view of the majority in the Court of Final Appeal.130 Soon
120

Id. paras. 21, 23–24.
The compensation to the DRC included mainly infrastructure comprising “railroads, asphalted and
non-asphalted roads, urban networks, airports, hospitals, hydroelectric and electric stations, buildings, houses,
health centers and universities.” Id. para. 88.
122 Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 16–17; Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 4, 17–29. See
generally Suzanne Siu, Note, The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Minerals for Infrastructure
Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 599, 603 (2010)
(describing the Sino-Congolese collaboration as “a sovereign-commercial hybrid that draws . . . upon the
doctrines of: (1) public international law; (2) international commercial law; and (3) public regulatory and
administrative law,” and pointing out that the collaboration is “neither an investment treaty based on reciprocal
inter-state promises, nor an investment contract involving a genuinely private investor.”).
123 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 19; Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D paras. 2–4.
124 See infra notes 125–31 and accompanying text.
125 Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D para. 148.
126 FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, paras. 181, 241–45,
282 (C.A.) (H.K.).
127 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 32.
128 Id. para. 415.
129 Id. paras. 1–180 (Bokhary, J., dissenting); id. paras. 417–532 (Mortimer J., dissenting).
130 Compare id. paras. 325–27, 331, 336, 407 (noting that governance of foreign affairs, including the
setting of rules for immunity, is reserved by the Basic Law to Central People’s Government, and certifying
121
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afterwards, the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong issued its final judgment,
dismissing the case on grounds of absolute sovereign immunity.131
C. Beijing’s Intervention in the Congo Cases
Beijing kept an eye on the Congo cases from the very beginning, and
voiced its objection to the lawsuit.132 Shortly after the trial began in the Court
of First Instance, the executive branch of the Hong Kong government became
aware that the DRC had raised the issue of absolute sovereign immunity.133
Soon, the Secretary for Justice of Hong Kong intervened,134 and persuaded the
trial court to enter into evidence a letter from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,135 which stated China’s adherence to the absolute doctrine of
sovereign immunity in foreign affairs.136
When the Congo I case was appealed to the Court of Appeal, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs sent a second letter to the Hong Kong government, which
was again brought into court by the Secretary for Justice as intervener.137
Likewise, when the Court of Final Appeal heard the Congo III case, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a third letter.138 Both of these latter letters
restated China’s foreign policy of adhering to the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity.139 But each new letter also purports to explain a more specific issue,
including the emergence of vulture funds,140 and China’s signature to the UN
Convention.141
questions for review by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress), with Interpretation of
Article 13, supra note 9 (establishing that governance of foreign affairs, including setting state immunity rules,
is the province of the Central People’s Government.).
131 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs., [2011] Legal Reference System 1213 para. 8 (C.F.A.)
(H.K.) (final judgment).
132 See FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo I), [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410, paras. 13–14
(C.F.I.) (H.K.); see also Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 211 (“The Office of the Commissioner of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has also stated
clearly . . . that, regarding the issue of state immunity, the consistent position of China is that a state and its
property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including absolute immunity from jurisdiction and
from execution.”).
133 See Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410 para. 9.
134 Id.
135 Id. paras. 15, 31.
136 Id. para. 14.
137 FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 91 (C.A.)
(H.K.).
138 Congo III, [2011] Legal Reference System para. 211.
139 See id.; Congo II, 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66 para. 91.
140 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 211 (“Supporting the economic development of developing
states has also been one of the foreign policies of China. In recent years, certain foreign companies have
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Such active participation by Beijing is unprecedented in Hong Kong’s
judicial history.142 Beijing seemed particularly determined to influence the
outcome of the Congo case, and went to extreme lengths to impose its absolute
doctrine of sovereign immunity on Hong Kong.143
D. Judicial Opinions and the Outcome of the Congo Case
At the beginning of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal, Judge
Bokhary wrote, “The core question of law in this case is about the extent of the
[sovereign] immunity from suit . . . . Is it absolute immunity or is it restrictive
immunity . . . ?”144 Given the statutory vacuum on the subject of sovereign
immunity, judges had to find guidance in the common law, and the Basic Law
of Hong Kong,145 which serves as Hong Kong’s de facto constitution.146 The
common law of Hong Kong, which “shall be maintained” under the Basic
Law,147 had incorporated the restrictive rule long ago.148 But the Basic Law
vests the power to conduct foreign affairs in the national government in
Beijing,149 and specifically prohibits Hong Kong courts from adjudicating
“acts of state such as . . . foreign affairs.”150 As shown previously in Part I.D,
China is widely viewed as one of the last stubborn absolutist holdouts.151 The
three letters that the Secretary for Justice presented to the courts have also
made the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ preference for absolute immunity
acquired the debts of impoverished African states and profited from claiming those debts through judicial
proceedings, thus adding to the financial burden of these impoverished states and hampering the efforts of the
international community in assisting these states. Such practice is inequitable and some states have even
enacted legislation to impose restrictions on the same. If the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region were
to adopt a regime of state immunity that is not consistent with that of the state and thereby facilitate the
pursuance of the above-mentioned practice, it would be contradictory to the above-mentioned foreign policy of
China and tarnish the international image of China.”).
141 See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
142 See Eric T.M. Cheung, Undermining Our Judicial Independence and Autonomy, 41 H.K. L.J. 411, 411
(2011) (stating that the Court of Final Appeal “held for the first time that it must first refer four
questions . . . to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress . . . before [the Court of Final
Appeal] is to make any final decision on the applicable principle of state immunity.”).
143 See id. at 412 (describing the increasingly insistent letters from the Chinese Government to the courts
of Hong Kong).
144 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 2.
145 See id. paras. 227–31, 318.
146 MUSHKAT, supra note 4, at 145 (1997); see also DOBINSON & ROEBUCK, supra note 1, at 23 (“The
Basic Law is sometimes referred to as Hong Kong’s constitution.”).
147 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 8 (H.K.)
148 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
149 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 13 (H.K.).
150 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 19 (H.K.).
151 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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abundantly clear.152 Hong Kong’s common law seems incompatible with
Beijing’s foreign affairs. Therefore, “the core question of law” in the Congo III
case is whether Hong Kong should follow the restrictive approach that its
common law prescribes, or the absolute approach that Beijing’s foreign policy
dictates.153
To resolve this core question in the Congo cases, nine judges in three
courts (not counting the Standing Committee) wrote seven separate judicial
opinions,154 many of which are extremely thorough. Obviously, any attempt at
summarizing the hundreds of pages of opinions within the limited space of this
Comment would inevitably run a tremendous risk of oversimplification.
Therefore, the summary below focuses only on points relevant to the core
question identified above, and has to forego discussions on many weighty
issues—the most prominent being Hong Kong’s “threatened constitutional
crisis” caused by the Congo III case—that are less relevant for our purposes.155
On sovereign immunity, Judge Reyes of the Court of First Instance started
his analysis with the remark that “[i]t is plain that immediately prior to 1 July
1997 Hong Kong followed the restrictive approach,” and he buttressed that
with pre-SIA case law, including The Philippine Admiralty and I Congreso del
Partido.156 He then turned to the question of sovereign immunity after 1997,
and enumerated a number of theories put forth by counsel for both sides of the
Congo I case.157 Notably, a “Theory 1” suggested that “as a result of the SIA
ceasing to have effect, the common law as it had developed prior to the
extension of the SIA to Hong Kong was revived and continues to apply.”158
Judge Reyes reluctantly expressed his “provisional view” that this theory, out
of all four, gives “the more correct and straightforward analysis.”159

152 See Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para.
211 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para.
91 (C.A.) (H.K.); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo I), [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410, para. 31
(C.F.I.) (H.K.).
153 Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 2, 211.
154 See Congo III, Legal Reference System; Congo II, 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66; Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D 410.
155 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 84.
156 Congo I, 1 H.K.L.R.D. paras. 37–41.
157 Id. paras. 42–82.
158 Id. para. 43.
159 Id. para. 71.
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The majority in the Court of Appeal, Judge Stock and Judge Yuen, shared
Reyes’ preference for Theory 1.160 The Court held that the common law of
Hong Kong had incorporated the restrictive rule of sovereign immunity before
it was given statutory effect by the SIA, and that once the SIA ceased to have
effect, the common law was resuscitated.161 Judge Yeung dissented. He argued
that courts in Hong Kong must follow Mainland China’s foreign policy of
adhering to the absolute doctrine, and he based this opinion on articles 13 and
19 of the Basic Law,162 which allocate foreign policy responsibilities to the
national government in Beijing.163
Two dissenting justices in the Court of Final Appeal agreed with the
majority opinions in the courts below that common law restrictive immunity
was revived after the SIA lapsed in 1997.164 Justice Bokhary wrote, “When
[the SIA] ceased to have effect in Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, [the restrictive]
rule of Hong Kong common law once again stood on its own feet.”165 Justice
Mortimer agreed: “When the [SIA] ceased to apply on 1 July 1997 the
common law became applicable as it had been before 1979.”166
The majority in the Court of Final Appeal, however, gave in to pressure
from Beijing. After quoting extensively from all three letters from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,167 and repeatedly quoting them afterward as authority and
source of law,168 the majority concluded that “as a matter of legal and
constitutional principle” it was not open to courts in Hong Kong to consider
the scope of sovereign immunity, and that Hong Kong courts must give total
deference to Beijing’s absolute approach.169 “[I]t is not for the Court to express
its opinion about the appropriateness of the [national government’s] policy of
absolute as opposed to restrictive immunity,” wrote the majority.170 More
tellingly, the Court suggested in a seemingly unprincipled fashion that Beijing
is free to “tailor its response to a dispute involving a foreign State on a case160

See FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 47 (C.A.)

(H.K.).
161

Id.
Id. para. 250 (Yeung, J., dissenting).
163 Id. para. 228.
164 Compare Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System
para. 138 (C.F.A.) (H.K.) (Bokhary, J., dissenting) with id. paras. 493, 523 (Mortimer, J., dissenting).
165 Id. para. 138 (Bokhary, J., dissenting).
166 Id. paras. 496, 523 (Mortimer, J., dissenting).
167 Id. paras. 197, 202, 211 (majority opinion).
168 Id. paras. 224, 259–61, 267, 280, 363.
169 Id. para. 226.
170 Id. para. 281.
162
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by-case or treaty-by-treaty basis.”171 Because of this Court of Final Appeal’s
majority decision in the Congo III case, which the Standing Committee in
Beijing later affirmed,172 Hong Kong reverted to absolute sovereign immunity.
III. WHY THE SHIFT TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY WAS WRONG
The most significant impact of the Congo III case on Hong Kong, aside
from any constitutional issue, is Hong Kong’s shift from its common law
restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity to China’s absolute doctrine. Hong
Kong’s shift will have profound negative implications on China as well. This
Part argues the shift to absolute immunity was wrong, because it is (A)
regressive for Hong Kong, (B) untenable for China, and (C) detrimental to
China’s long-term interests.
A. The Regression for Hong Kong
First, the shift to absolute sovereign immunity was wrong because it
represents a regression for Hong Kong. As Part I.B of this Comment has
shown, and as all the judges in the Congo cases agreed, Hong Kong followed
the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity before 1997.173 The history of
restrictive sovereign immunity in Hong Kong can be traced back to as early as
1956.174 It was a case appealed from Hong Kong that introduced the restrictive
rule to English law in 1975,175 and the restrictive rule was endorsed by the
highest authorities both in case law and by statute.176 Hong Kong was arguably
a pioneer in the development of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity
among common law jurisdictions.177
1. Regression Violates Customary International Law.
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the recent shift to absolute sovereign
immunity caused by the Congo cases was regressive. This regression is more
171

Id. para. 282.
Interpretation of Article 13, supra note 9.
173 Compare Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System
paras. 62 (Bokhary, J., dissenting), and id. para 222 (majority opinion), and id. para 502 (Mortimer, J.,
dissenting), with FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, paras. 45,
78 (C.A.) (H.K.), and id. para 246 (Yuen, J., concurring), and FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo
(Congo I), [2009] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 410, para. 37 (C.F.I.).
174 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
172
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than just a description of the fact that Hong Kong reverted to an absolutist
position that it had abandoned long ago. A regression is of particular
significance in customary international law, which does not permit a state to
unilaterally withdraw from an established rule to which it once agreed.178
But is restrictive sovereign immunity such an established rule of customary
international law from which no state can unilaterally withdraw? The Congo
III court refused to rule on this question.179 What many judges in the Congo
cases, including both the majority and the minority in the Court of Final
Appeal, share in common is an explicit, total disregard for customary
international law.180 Commentators have already criticized the Congo III court
for ignoring international law.181 Little more needs to be said here other than
that international law should not be sidelined because sovereign immunity “is
an undisputed principle of customary international law.”182 Regardless of the
attitudes of Hong Kong courts, there are some strong indications that the
restrictive rule has been crystallizing into a rule of international law. To find
such indications, one can start by looking no further than the very line of cases
that helped establish the restrictive rule in Hong Kong’s common law.

178 See Int’l Law Ass’n, Comm. on the Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 27 (2000) (“There is fairly widespread
agreement that, even if there is a persistent objector rule in international law, it applies only when the
customary rule is in the process of emerging. It does not, therefore, benefit States which came into existence
only after the rule matured, or which became involved in the activity in question only at a later stage. Still less
can it be invoked by those who existed at the time and were already engaged in the activity which is the
subject of the rule, but failed to object at that stage. In other words, there is no ‘subsequent objector’ rule.”).
179 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 410–
11 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
180 For example, the majority in Congo III decided to ignore international law. Congo III, Legal Reference
System para. 411 (“[W]e do not consider it necessary for us to enter upon [the question of customary
international law] given that we have provisionally reached the conclusion that, as a matter of municipal law
and constitutional principle, the doctrine of state immunity applicable in [Hong Kong] is one of absolute
immunity.”). The dissenting Judge Bokhary made the same decision. Id. para. 121 (“[I]t is unnecessary for me
to say whether I consider restrictive immunity to be a rule of customary international law. Nor is it necessary
for me to decide whether persistent objection works.”).
181 For example, Professor Carty speculated that the judges on the Congo case were so keen on building it
up “into a constitutional confrontation along the lines of The Common Law versus the Sovereignty of the PRC”
that customary international law was, intentionally or not, sidelined. Tony Carty, Why Are Hong Kong Judges
Keeping a Distance from International Law, and with What Consequences? Reflections on the CFA Decision
in DRC v FG Hemisphere, 41 H.K. L.J. 401, 408 (2011).
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 4 ch. 5, intro.
note (1987); see also United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
supra note 84, at 1 (“[T]he jurisdictional immunities of States and their property are generally accepted as a
principle of customary international law”).
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2. Restrictive Immunity is Becoming a Rule of Customary International
Law
In 1977, following Hong Kong’s lead in The Philippine Admiral, the Court
of Appeal in England introduced restrictive sovereign immunity into English
law in Trendtex Trading,183 a case that the House of Lords would later rely on
as persuasive authority in I Congreso del Partido.184 In Trendtex Trading, Lord
Denning refused to wait for the House of Lords to act, because “we [the Court
of Appeal] are not considering here the rules of English law on which the
House has the final say. We are considering the rules of international law.”185
Furthermore, Lord Denning intended his endorsement of the restrictive
approach to contribute to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law, and his Lordship articulated the reasoning in his
characteristically refreshing and poetic style:
I would ask: is there not here sufficient evidence to show that the rule
of international law has changed? What more is needed? Are we to
wait until every other country save England recognises the change?
Ought we not to act now? Whenever a change is made, someone
some time has to make the first move. One country alone may start
the process. Others may follow. At first a trickle, then a stream, last a
flood. England should not be left behind on the bank. “. . . We must
186
take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures.”

Thus, in as early as January 1977, when Trendtex Trading was decided, the
restrictive rule of sovereign immunity was already so far into the process of
crystallization that English judges were impatient enough to risk reversal by
the House of Lords, lest “England be left behind on the bank.”187
Then in 1981, Lord Wilberforce, too, intended his decision in I Congreso
del Partido “to form part of the corpus of international law.”188 According to
his Lordship’s reading of Trendtex Trading, that precedent “establishes that, as
a matter of contemporary international law, the ‘restrictive’ theory should be

183

Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 at 546 (Eng.).
Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board ) v. I Congreso del Partido (Owners), [1983] 1
A.C. 244 (H.L.) [261] (appeal taken from Eng.).
185 Trendtex Trading Corp., Q.B. at 557
186 Id. at 556 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 4, sc. 3).
187 Id.
188 I Congreso del Partido, 1 A.C. at 257.
184
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generally applied.”189 He found it “clear that international law, in a general
way, in 1978, gave support to a ‘restrictive’ theory of state immunity . . . .”190
Aside from case law, many commentators have long recognized restrictive
sovereign immunity as a rule of international law.191 For example, after
reviewing the works of many commentators, a report to the International Law
Commission in 1982 concluded, “The restrictive trend is so overwhelming in
the opinions of contemporary writers that it is no longer possible to find any
trace of an ‘absolute’ doctrine among living authorities on international
law.”192 More recently, Lady Fox wrote in 2008,
[T]he overwhelming majority of States now supports a restrictive
doctrine. . . . [I]t is rare in the last decade to find a case where a
national court confronted with a claim relating to a commercial
transaction involving a State trading entity has rejected jurisdiction
on the basis of an absolute rule of immunity. With the adoption of the
UN Convention one may accept that a rule of restrictive immunity
193
now applies.

Because the restrictive rule of sovereign immunity is forming, or perhaps
has already formed, into a rule of customary international law, a regression to
the absolute rule is not permissible under international law in Hong Kong, a
jurisdiction that, for many years, followed the new restrictive approach.194
Assuming China is responsible for this regression through its heavy-handed
intervention in the Congo cases, and given that it is a signatory to the UN

189

Id. at 261.
Id. at 260.
191 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Fourth Rep. on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Int’l Law Comm’n,¶¶ 117–19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/357,
(Mar. 31, 1982) (by Sompong Sucharitkul) (citing a large number of commentators from the 1880s till the
1970s from a variety of countries who support the restrictive doctrine); Diane Howard, Achieving a Level
Playing Field in Public-Private Partnerships: Can Sovereign Immunity Upset the Balance?, 73 J. AIR L. &
COM. 723, 756 (2008) (“It is safe to conclude that the restrictive theory of state immunity has achieved the
status of customary international law, for it is followed by a majority of the international community.”); Qi,
supra note 46, at 331 n.78 (“It could be argued that the restrictive approach is thriving as a promising
candidate for the status of a custom, and the adoption of the 2004 UN Convention is a definite boost to this
approach.”). But see, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 79, at 325–26 (“It is far from easy to state the current legal
position in terms of customary or general international law. Recent writers emphasise that there is a trend in
the practice of states towards the restrictive doctrine of immunity but avoid firm and precise prescriptions as to
the present state of the law . . . . This divergence of views . . . is usually ignored in the academic sources.”).
192 Fourth Rep. on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, supra note 191 at 228.
193 HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 412 (2d ed. 2008) (emphasis added).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 183–90.
190
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Convention, China may have opened itself up to criticism that its action
“defeat[s] the object and purpose”195 of the UN Convention.196
B. A Pledge of Persistent Adherence to the Untenable
The shift to absolute sovereign immunity was also wrong for China,
because the absolutist position cannot be, and has not been, defended
persistently.197 Because the restrictive doctrine is crystallizing into a rule of
customary international law around the world, the only way for China to opt
out of it and hang on to the old absolute doctrine is to be a persistent objector
to the emerging restrictive rule.198 Therefore, by intervening in the Congo
cases and imposing its absolutist foreign policy on the Hong Kong judiciary,
Beijing has effectively reaffirmed a commitment to persistently adhere to the
absolute doctrine. The emphasis is on the word “persistent,” and it entails a
stringent requirement:199 China must continuously and vocally lodge protests
against the restrictive rule, and consistently affirm its unwavering support for
the absolute rule.200
1. China’s Record Does Not Show Enough Persistency
China’s actual track record, however, fails to meet such a stringent
requirement. Despite what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adamantly claimed
in its letters to the government of Hong Kong in the Congo cases, numerous
objective indicia show that China’s record on adhering to the absolute doctrine
of sovereign immunity has not been entirely consistent.
Some early precedents from the 1950s till the 1980s show that when
political subdivisions of China or Chinese instrumentalities were sued abroad,

195

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 93, art. 18.
Id.
197 See infra Part III.B.1.
198 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202,
233–41 (2010) (discussing the intellectual roots of the persistent objector doctrine); see also, e.g., BEDERMAN,
supra note 13, at 22 (“States were obliged to protest loud and often if they wished to avoid being bound by a
rule of emerging global custom. . . [T]he general assumption is that, for global custom, silence means
acceptance of a new rule.”); BROWNLIE, supra note 79, at 11 (“Evidence of objection must be clear and there is
probably a presumption of acceptance which is to be rebutted. . . . [This principle] is well recognized by
international tribunals.”).
199 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age
of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A] nation must repeatedly and prominently object to
the rule on the international stage.”).
200 Id.
196
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the Chinese sovereign defendants sometimes did not even raise the issue of
immunity, and simply submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.201
After “[e]xamining China’s practice over the last three decades” before 1983,
Mr. O’Brien’s observation was that “there ha[d] not been any consistent
adherence to a strict or absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.”202 In the
early 1980s, when the restrictive rule had already been incorporated into Hong
Kong’s common law203 and was forming into a rule of customary international
law,204 Chinese legal scholars, according to O’Brien, were still “uncertain as to
the current status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”205 The uncertainty
and inconsistency of the Chinese position was so great that O’Brien predicted,
“China is unlikely to insist on an absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.”206
A more recent deviation from persistent objection occurred in 2005 when a
Singaporean court dismissed a Chinese state-owned enterprise’s claim of
sovereign immunity.207 The interesting development in that case is that the
Chinese government body responsible for the management of large stateowned corporations, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council, openly “support[ed] the Singaporean
government and concerned parties to investigate” the Chinese defendant, and
instructed the defendant state-owned Chinese company to “cooperatewith [sic]
investigators for the case.”208 The apparent rationale for the Chinese
government’s decision is that the case should be handled “in line with
international practice.”209
Perhaps because of this kind of pragmatic legal flexibility and
maneuverability that the Chinese government exhibits in individual cases, the
authoritative legal encyclopedia Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong includes a
note which reads, “[T]he major difference between the Chinese position and
the doctrine of restrictive immunity is theoretical. In practice, the Chinese
201 See, e.g., Fisheries Dep’t Kwangtung Provincial Gov’t v. Fishing Trawler “North Carolina”, [1951] 35
H.K.L.R. 72 (H.C.); China Ocean Shipping Co. v S. Austl., (1980) 145 CLR 172 (Austl.).
202 Roderick O’Brien, Sovereign Immunity and the People’s Republic of China, 13 H.K. L.J. 202, 202–03
(1983).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 185–93.
205 O’Brien, supra note 202, at 204
206 Id. at 207.
207 See John Burton, A Singapore Court Dismisses CAOHC’s Claim of Immunity, FINANCIAL TIMES (May
10, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a14ae94-c17e-11d9-943f-00000e2511c8.html.
208 CAO Debt Issues to be Solved in Line with Int’l Practice, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 15, 2004),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/15/content_2338923.htm.
209 Id.
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pragmatic approach through its recognition of exceptions has reduced the
practical difference to vanishing point.”210 In a way, this encyclopedia entry
may relieve some of the anxiety over Hong Kong’s adoption of Beijing’s
absolutist position. But, on the other hand, it undermines, perhaps even directly
contradicts, Beijing’s assertion of persistent adherence to the absolute doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
In any event, the ultimate blow to any Chinese claim of persistent objection
must be China’s signature to the UN Convention, which embraces the
restrictive rule of sovereign immunity.211 Not only was China among the first
few nations to sign the UN Convention,212 a representative of the Chinese
government chaired the committee in the International Law Commission that
drafted the UN Convention.213 Perhaps the intimate Chinese involvement in the
International Law Commission’s effort to codify the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity could be explained away as some sinister plot to sabotage
the codification effort from within. But if there were any such plan, it was
unsuccessful. After all, China did support the UN Convention by giving its
signature in 2005,214 thereby obliging itself under the Vienna Convention “to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the UN
Convention.215 It seems exceedingly difficult to square this history with
Beijing’s unyielding insistence that it has always consistently adhered to the
absolute doctrine. The explanation given by the Commissioner of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs seems anemic and specious:
China signed the Convention on 14 September 2005, to express
China’s support of the above coordination efforts made by the
international community. However, until now China has not yet
ratified the Convention, and the Convention itself has not yet entered
into force. Therefore, the Convention has no binding force on China,
and moreover it cannot be the basis of assessing China’s principled
position on relevant issues. . . . After signature of the Convention, the
position of China in maintaining absolute immunity has not been

210
211
212
213
214
215

HALSBURY’S LAWS OF HONG KONG pt. 190.041, n.17 (2009), available at LexisNexis.
See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See Caplan, supra note 80, at 761 n.142.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 93, art. 18.
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changed, and has never applied or recognised the so-called principle
216
or theory of ‘restrictive immunity’. . . .

The Court of Appeal, for whom the above statement was really intended,
simply responded, “It is not easy to know what to make of this, for to suggest
that signature of a multilateral convention that adopts a particular policy is of
no use in assessing the attitude of the signatory state to that policy seems
illogical.”217 Of course, as laid out at the outset of this discussion,218 the focus
here is not on assessing what is the attitude of the signatory state—China could
not have made its “principled position” any clearer; it is on ascertaining the
persistency by which China has objected to the restrictive rule and embraced
the absolute rule of sovereign immunity. The persistent object doctrine sets a
higher standard,219 which China has clearly failed to meet by signing the UN
Convention.
2. UN Convention Renders Absolute Doctrine Ultimately Untenable
Even if China could persistently object to the restrictive rule, the UN
Convention will eventually render the absolutist position untenable. China can
probably live with the bad name of being an “un-persistent” objector in
violation of customary international law. But what is more troubling for China
and Hong Kong is the prospect of the UN Convention coming into force.
Publicists’ opinions on the likelihood of this prospect diverge wildly, ranging
from the highly optimistic220 to the extremely pessimistic.221 Despite the
divergence of opinion, even the most pessimistic commentators do not rule out
the possibility that the UN Convention may take effect someday.
Therefore, the UN Convention represents a real probability that China and
Hong Kong may be forced to reconsider the absolutist stance they take,

216 FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 91 (C.A.)
(H.K.) (emphasis added) (quoting a letter from the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
217 Id. para. 92.
218 See supra text accompanying note 199.
219 See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
220 E.g., Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS.
149, 151 (2011) (“[I]t seems likely that the 30 ratifications necessary to bring it into effect will soon be
achieved.”).
221 E.g., George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing
Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for its
Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 688 (2008) (“[The UN Convention] now rests in a state of limbo
with an uncertain future.”).
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especially if the opinion of the more optimistic commentators turns out to be
true. Given the trend toward restrictive immunity in international law,222 in the
long run, as time passes by, the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity will
only become increasingly obsolete and untenable. In the fullness of time, if and
when China eventually ratifies the UN Convention and thereby adopts the
restrictive approach, problems that emerged in the Congo cases would likely
rear their ugly heads again. Vulture funds similar to FG Hemisphere would
again be able to flock to Hong Kong courts and swoop in to feast on the
carcasses of impoverished war-torn countries like the DRC that have been
crushed by the murderous burden of debt. Persistent adherence to the
ultimately untenable absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity is certainly not
the answer.
C. A Detriment to China’s Long-term Interests
Lastly, apart from abstract legal principles, the shift to absolute sovereign
immunity was wrong because it will prove detrimental to China’s long-term
economic interests. As a practical matter, the private sector in the Chinese
economy is thriving and is heavily engaged in foreign trade,223 but it faces
various problems with foreign counterparties, including the increasingly
daunting task of overseas debt collection.224 Therefore, pragmatically speaking,
it will probably harm China’s own interests in the long run to categorically
refuse to hear any plaintiff’s case, including even valid claims of Chinese
plaintiffs, against any foreign sovereign defendant.
1. The Government’s Calculation of State Interests was Flawed
Such practical calculation of state interests is an important factor in
deciding legal cases for the Chinese government. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs made this clear in its third letter to the Court of Final Appeal, “The
regime of state immunity concerns the foreign policy and overall interests of
the state . . . .”225 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time of
the Congo III case, the government’s own estimate was that, for Hong Kong to
retain its restrictive position on sovereign immunity, it would

222

See supra notes 185–93 and accompanying text.
CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: CHINA 127 (2008).
224 See infra notes 262–70 and accompanying text.
225 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 211
(C.F.A.) (H.K.).
223
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“undoubtedly . . . have a long-term impact and serious prejudice to the overall
interests of China . . . .”226
The ministry gave two main reasons to justify the official conclusion. First,
the ministry feared that the restrictive doctrine would upset foreign debtor
states with which China maintains good relations.227 In the particular case at
hand, the ministry admitted, “As a matter of fact, since the inception of the
[Congo cases], the Government of the [DRC] has repeatedly made
representations to the Central People’s Government [of China] through the
diplomatic channel.”228 Second, the Chinese government was worried that
foreign sovereign debtors might reciprocally adopt the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity, and might retaliate against Chinese assets abroad.229
Professor Eric T.M. Cheung has pointed out the absurdity of this second
rationale against retaining the restrictive rule in Hong Kong: the DRC, like
many countries in the world, has already adopted the restrictive doctrine.230
Therefore, China’s commercial activities abroad would not, at least not in
theory, be covered by sovereign immunity in these debtor countries, regardless
of the outcome of the Congo case in Hong Kong. Experts in Congolese law
raised this point in litigation as well.231 When counsel for the DRC tried to
dispute it in oral argument, the court decided, perhaps quite wisely, to ignore
this matter altogether.232 It seems hard to imagine anyone, except paranoid
mandarins on the top floors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who would
think that this single lawsuit in Hong Kong should have much to do with the
legal protections that foreign countries afford to Chinese assets overseas.233
The real defect in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ calculation of China’s
state interests is that it is too narrow and too shortsighted. It is too narrow
because the ministry took into account no parties other than the governments
of China and foreign debtor countries.234 Other parties who stand to be affected
by the ruling on the Congo III case, such as private creditors, were simply not
contemplated. There appears to be no one in the ministry who bothered to look
226

Id.
Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Cheung, supra note 142, at 417–18.
231 Congo III, Legal Reference System para. 33.
232 Id.
233 Cf. id. (“Nobody suggests that the extent of the state immunity to which the Congo is entitled depends
on the extent of the state immunity available in its courts.”).
234 See id. para. 211.
227
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after the commercial interests of Chinese plaintiffs, for instance. The
calculation is also admittedly shortsighted, as the ministry acknowledged that it
intervened at the DRC’s request, and that it had the immediate case in mind.235
Although the ministry talked of “long-term impact,” there was no discussion of
the changing trade and economic conditions in the years to come.236
2. Absolute Sovereign Immunity Will Increasingly Harm Private Sector
Plaintiffs
But whatever the government’s view may be, the real economic landscape
of China is changing fast, giving rise to more and more potential private
plaintiffs.237 The growth of the private sector in China has been rapid,
especially since the 1990s.238 In 1998, private businesses in China “had
reached 32.4 million and employed 78.24 million people.”239 Although “the
private sector is hard to document,” in 2005 experts estimated that it accounted
for about seventy percent of China’s gross domestic product. 240 That same
year, Businessweek magazine described China as “a private-sector
economy.”241 According to the official national television station of China, by
2008 the private sector had “gone from being worth nothing to 19 trillion
yuan . . . contributing 65 percent of the country’s [gross domestic product]. It
also accounts for 75 percent of national employment, and around half of the
country’s tax revenue.”242 By the end of 2010, the number of private
enterprises in China had risen to more than 8.4 million, representing an annual
increase of 14.3 percent, and accounting for seventy-four percent of all
Chinese businesses.243

235

Id.
Id.
237 CIA, supra note 223, 127 (“China’s economy during the last quarter century has changed from a
centrally planned system that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that
has a rapidly growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy.”).
238 Qi, supra note 46, at 328.
239 John H. Matheson, Globalization with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Use of Merger, Acquisition
and Investment Policy in Its Economic Development Strategy, 15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1,
32 (2007) (citation omitted).
240 Pete Engardio, “China is a Private-Sector Economy,” BUS. WK. (Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948478.htm (quoting Fan Gang, a Chinese economist based in
Beijing).
241 Id.
242 Private Economy’s Rapid Growth in China, CCTV NEWS, (Sept. 27, 2009), http://english.cctv.com/
program/bizchina/20090927/101438.shtml.
243 Andrew Bruce, Global Private-Sector Growth Accelerates, CHINA DAILY, June 13 2011, at 15.
236
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By and large, the Chinese government has welcomed this rapid
development of the private-sector economy.244 In 2004, the National People’s
Congress passed amendments to the Chinese Constitution,245 which “enshrined
private property as ‘inviolable.’”246 Then in 2007, the National People’s
Congress passed the National Property Law,247 which, according to the
prevalent view, offers protection to private property for the first time since the
founding of communist China in 1949.248 The State Council set out policies in
both 2005 and 2010 to encourage the continuous development of the private
sector in the economy.249 Given the trend of strong private sector growth over
the past decades and an increase in legislative and policy support of the
government,250 the private sector in China will likely continue to expand in the
future.
More importantly, this booming private sector has more foreign contacts,
as it “tends to account for a disproportionately large part of China’s
exports . . . .”251 Take for example China’s trade and investment in Africa,

244

Qi, supra note 46, at 328–29.
XIANFA art. 11, § 2 (2004) (China) (“The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the nonpublic sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The State encourages,
supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law,
exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy.”); id. art. 13, §§ 1–2 (2004)
(China) (“The lawful private property of citizens is inviolable. The state protects according to law the right of
citizens to own and inherit private property.”).
246 Ryan van Steenis, From Mao to Madison and Back: An Examination of China’s National Property
Law and Its Diminished Potential, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 35, 38 (2009) (quoting XIANFA art. 13, § 1
(2004) (China)).
247 Wuquan fa (
[Property Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar.
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) (China).
248 Steenis, supra note 246, at 38, 40 n.26.
249 Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli He Yingdao Minjian Touzi Jiankang Fazhan De Ruogan Jianyi (
[Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and
Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investment] (promulgated by the State Council, May 7, 2010,
effective May 7, 2010), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=130117&lib=law; see also Bruce,
supra note 244, at 15.
250 See, e.g., Qi, supra note 46, at 328 (2008) (“[T]his proclamation [that China is a private-sector
economy] may better be taken as a prospect rather than a reality at this moment.”); Zhou Xin & Koh Gui Qing,
China Eyes Private Sector to Offset Growth Slowdown, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/us-china-economy-investment-idUSTRE7BF0KX20111216; Hongliang Zheng
& Yang Yang, Development of Chinese Private Sector in the Past 30 Years: Retrospect and Prospect 14–15
(University of Nottingham China Policy Institute, Discussion Paper No. 45, 2009) (“The first trend is that the
private sector’s rate of growth will continue to be higher than national GDP growth in China, and its share of
GDP will rise further.”).
251 Matheson, supra note 239, at 32 (citation omitted); see also Iftekhar Hasan et al., Institutional
Development, Financial Deepening and Economic Growth: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 157,
159 (2009) (“The growth of the private sector has . . . led to China’s impressive share in world exports.”).
245
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which seems to be of particular relevance to the Congo case. Although
commentators tend to focus on the growing presence of large Chinese stateowned enterprises in Africa, private businesses from China are also major
participants.252 Because they deem Africa as one of the last untapped regions
of growth, Chinese private enterprises have felt “a renewed urgency . . . to
relocate to Africa.”253 While most of these private enterprises are in mining,
telecommunications, construction and infrastructure projects,254 Chinese
retailers and wholesalers have also followed the business community into
Africa.255 In 2005, the United Nations Development Program, together with the
Chinese government and a trade association representing 16,500 Chinese
private companies,256 launched the China–Africa Business Council, which was
“believed to be the first Public-Private Partnership (PPP) initiative between
China and Africa under the South-South Cooperation Framework.”257 In
accordance with official government policy,258 the China–Africa Chamber of
Industry and Commerce was established in 2006.259 By 2009, the Conference
of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs had been held three times, with the
location of the conference alternating between China and Africa.260 There is
optimism in the legal literature that the presence of private Chinese enterprises
will continue to grow in African countries.261

252 See generally Jing Gu, China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African
Development, 21 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 570, 571–73 (2009) (detailing the growth of China’s private sector in
Africa, and contradicting the convention view that emphasizes China’s state-owned enterprises).
253 Jeremy Stevens, Global: China and Africa – Pragmatic Partners Maturing, STANDARD BANK 3 (Apr.
28, 2011), http://ws9.standardbank.co.za/sbrp/DocumentDownloader?docId=2916.
254 Id.
255 Id.; see also David Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
65, 83 (2011) (“[P]rivate Chinese investment is beginning to flow into [Angola]. To date, such investment has
largely focused on the extractive industries (principally oil) and telecommunications sectors.”).
256 U.N. Dev. Programme, Project Summary: Support to Establishing the China Africa Business Council
(CABC), www.undp.org.cn/projects/43576.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
257 Id.; see also Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects—China-Africa Trade: A New
Fair Trade Arrangement, or the Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 527 n.127
(2008).
258 See generally GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, CHINA’S AFRICAN POLICY (2006), available at http://www.gov.
cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156490.htm.
259 Uché U. Ewelukwa, South-South Trade and Investment: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly—African
Perspectives, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 513, 572 (2011).
260 Muhammad Yamany & Zhang Lin, 3rd Conference of Chinese, African Entrepreneurs Opens in
Egypt, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 7, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/07/content_124076
39.htm.
261 See, e.g., Haroz, supra note 255, at 83 (“[A]s the Angolan economy expands and Chinese private
sector confidence in Angola grows, larger and more diversified Chinese investments should follow.”).
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However, more commercial activities overseas inevitably lead to more
disputes with foreign counterparties, which could in turn lead to a greater need
to resolve such disputes and more legal actions against foreign defendants. In
2005, the Chinese press reported that, “a large number of private enterprises
and share-holding enterprises acquired the right to export, emerging as a new
force with rapid growth of export.”262 Yet, in the same breath, the press painted
a bleak picture of Chinese exporters with substandard bookkeeping, overdue
accounts receivable, foreign counterparty defaults, and bad debts overseas.263 It
was common practice among Chinese business enterprises to keep unpaid
accounts receivable on their books for years undisclosed to the public, which
contributed to a large amount of bad debts.264 Even in 2005, long before the
recent global economic recession, Chinese overseas accounts receivable were
estimated to total over $100 billion, and the figure was growing by $15 billion
per year.265 Later, in 2007, allegations began to fly that some overseas buyers
were cheating Chinese exporters by routinely delaying payments.266 Although
companies had been warned of the high risks in emerging markets, including
markets in Africa, these emerging markets remained “major destinations for
Chinese enterprises.”267 Thus, Chinese exporters’ troubles with delinquent
foreign buyers continue to present a problem, and they seem to have only
worsened.268 An alarming number of Chinese businesses fall victim to fraud
overseas,269 and the total amount of bad debts owed to them in overseas trade
has been steadily climbing by $15 to $17 billion annually since 2005.270 All of
these developments point to the growing need for China’s private sector to
resolve international commercial disputes under the law.
Chinese exporters’ accounts-receivable problems bear a remarkable
resemblance to some of the underlying facts in the Congo cases. It was
precisely an overdue account receivable on the books of a Yugoslavian
262

China Burdened with US$100 Billion Overdue Accounts Receivable, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (last
updated Mar. 30 2005), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/30/eng20050330_178775.html.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. (citing Han Jiaping, director of the credit management department under the Research Institute of
Ministry of Commerce).
266 Olivia Chung, China’s Debtors Not Paying Up, ASIA TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/China_Business/IC03Cb02.html.
267 Id.
268 Chen Yang, Collecting Overseas Debts Is Not Easy, GLOBAL TIMES (June 13, 2011), http://www.
globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/661190/Collecting-overseas-debts-is-not-easy.aspx.
269 Id. (citing Kroll, a risk management consultancy headquartered in New York).
270 Id. (citing Han Jiaping, “director of the credit management department under the Research Institute of
the Ministry of Commerce”).
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construction service exporter that eventually led to the Congo cases.271 Of
course, not all of the hundreds of billions of China’s overseas bad debts are
owed to private Chinese businesses by governments of failed states. The exact
figures for foreign sovereign debts held by private Chinese parties are difficult
to ascertain, as “there [are] no official statistics on China’s overseas accounts
receivable yet to be recovered.”272 But according to Mr. Dahai Qi, a Chinese
diplomat in the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs:273
[I]t is undeniable that the expansion of private sector in the Chinese
economy as well as in the international trade area has created a new
major interest group in Chinese society and also led to an increasing
possibility of disputes between Chinese private persons and foreign
State entities . . . . To [Qi’s] knowledge, disputes of this kind or of a
similar nature did happen on some occasions in the recent
274
past . . . .

In other words, it is not a remote, potential possibility that private Chinese
citizens or businesses may have good legal claims against foreign states or
their sovereign instrumentalities. Such cases have already emerged. As “a new
major interest group in Chinese society,”275 the private sector should be taken
into consideration, when calculating China’s national interest.
In view of this changing economic and political reality, it is highly
plausible and quite reasonable that a private Chinese creditor, for instance, may
wish to challenge sovereign immunity in her home court somewhere in China,
in order to collect payment from her delinquent foreign sovereign debtor.
Indeed, Mr. Qi has suggested that as China’s private sector grows in
international trade, the likelihood of such a case will probably only increase in

271

See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
China Burdened with US$100 Billion Overdue Accounts Receivable, supra note 262 (citing Mei
Xinyu, a researcher with the Ministry of Commerce); see also Yang, supra note 268 (quoting Han Jiaping as
saying “[I]t is only an estimation, as so far no authorities have conducted such a survey”).
273 See Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Fourth Committee Chairman Says Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Have Potential for Implementation of Millennium Declaration, Sustainable Development, U.N. Press Release
GA/SPD/289 (Nov. 10, 2004), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gaspd289.doc.htm (calling Mr. Qi a
delegate for China); see also E-mail from Qi Dahai, diplomat, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to author
(Nov. 18, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that Mr. Qi is in the legal staff of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
274 Qi, supra note 45, at 328 & n.72. Because of his sense of professional ethics, Mr. Qi declined to
disclose any details of the disputes that he mentioned in passing in his article. E-mail from Qi Dahai, supra
note 273.
275 Qi, supra note 46, at 328.
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the future.276 A private Chinese party may find itself in a position similar to
that of the American plaintiff in the Congo cases. By reaffirming its staunch
adherence to the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity in the Congo
cases,277 the Chinese government did more than just protect its friendly
relations with foreign governments. It also closed Chinese courts on countless
current and future Chinese plaintiffs who have, or will have, valid claims
against foreign sovereigns. Such uniform and blind protection of foreign state
interests at the expense of the legitimate interests of a large and growing
population of private Chinese businesses should surely weigh heavily against
the state interests of China in the foreign ministry’s calculus. The harmful
effects of the absolute doctrine on China’s private sector will only accrue, as
long as the official position of the government remains absolutist. In the long
run, the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity will prove a detriment to
China’s national interests.
IV. SUBDUING VULTURES WITHOUT REGRESSION TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Apart from being a case against a sovereign defendant, the Congo cases
were started by a vulture fund plaintiff.278 The litigation practices of vulture
funds often arouse understandably strong moral concerns and cause real
hardships to the third world.279 This part of the comment argues that the novel
challenge posed by vulture funds calls for a more targeted and nuanced
approach than a simple rule of restrictive sovereign immunity and that recent
anti-vulture legislation in the United Kingdom is a good model for Hong Kong
to follow.
A. The U.K. Legislative Answer to Moral Objections to Vulture Funds
Vulture funds pose a unique challenge to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.280 In the Congo cases, the involvement of a vulture plaintiff raises
questions difficult for the courts to address, such as the following: If the
restrictive doctrine should be adopted in China (or maintained in Hong Kong),
and assuming there is no dispute as to the commercial nature of the sovereign
defendant’s activities, how should the court resolve the Congo cases? The
276

Id. at 328 & n.72.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–43.
278 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 18
(C.F.A.) (H.K.).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 98, 100–08.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 94–108.
277
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Court of Appeal in the Congo II case, which did adhere to Hong Kong’s old
common law restrictive doctrine,281 had no problem answering this question.
Judge Stock wrote for the majority that he would allow the plaintiff vulture
fund to enforce the arbitral awards and that he would also shift fees to the
defendant DRC.282 By reaching this conclusion from the starting point of
restrictive immunity, the court’s position seemed quite mechanical and
inevitable. Judge Stock apparently wasted no time pondering the moral or
humanitarian policy implications of allowing a vulture fund to take its pound
of flesh from a deeply indebted third world country. None of the other Hong
Kong judges in favor of resuscitating English common law in the Congo cases
wrote about moral concerns, either.283 Moral indifference may be the right
attitude for judges,284 but there should be a moral or policy dimension for the
public and the legislature to consider.
Almost concurrently with the Congo cases in Hong Kong, several vulture
funds filed suits in the United Kingdom against foreign sovereign debtors.285
Although English judges were applying the restrictive doctrine and ruling in
favor of the vulture funds most of the time,286 the moral concerns with vulture
funds were not completely forgotten. In 2007, Justice Andrew Smith in the
High Court in London noted in his opinion in a vulture suit against Zambia:
“The proceedings arouse strong feelings. Zambia is a poor country and sees
itself as being vulnerable to ‘vulture funds’. They say that this claim for more
than US$55 million is an improper attempt by [the plaintiff vulture fund] to
exploit their vulnerability . . . .”287 Soon, the controversial vulture funds began
to attract the attention of the media and politicians in the United Kingdom.288

281

FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo II), [2010] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 66, para. 122 (C.A.)

(H.K.).
282

Id. para. 181.
Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 1–180 (Bokhary, J., dissenting); id. paras. 417–532
(Mortimer, J., dissenting).
284 See Jones, supra note 94, at 201 (“Whatever may be said of the morality of [vulture funds] and the
conduct of the PRC in Africa, such questions are not relevant to judges deciding the Congo Case.”).
285 Broomfield, supra note 101, at 504.
286 Id. at 504–05.
287 Donegal Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Zambia, [2007] EWHC (Comm) 197, [2] (Eng.). Justice Smith ruled
against Zambia, irrespective of the moral arguments, stating “I am concerned, of course, with the legal
questions that are raised by the applications before me and not with questions of morality or humanity.” Id.
288 See, e.g., Meirion Jones, UK Stops ‘Vulture Funds’ Picking on Poor, BBC NEWS (last updated Apr. 8,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8610062.stm (reporting on vulture litigations,
including Zambia’s case in the High Court, quoting Gordon Brown on his moral objection to vulture funds);
Liberia Ordered to Pay ‘Vulture Funds’ over 1978 Debt, BBC NEWS (last updated Nov. 26, 2009), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8380117.stm.
283
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Members of Parliament took on the cause of banning vulture funds.289 On
April 8, 2010, the Parliament passed the Debt Relief (Developing Countries)
Act,290 which “limits the amount of money that commercial creditors can
recover from certain developing countries,”291 including the DRC.292 The
British media dubbed this legislation a “ban” on vulture funds.293
B. The Need for Anti-vulture Legislation in the Congo Case in Hong Kong
This new legislative development in the United Kingdom has created an
interesting situation for Hong Kong: as most judges on the Congo cases
struggled against Beijing to preserve Hong Kong’s English common law
heritage, and relied on British precedents from before the era of vulture
funds,294 “Mother England” had already moved on. Even if the restrictive
doctrine of sovereign immunity were applied to the Congo III case, Hong
Kong would still be a step behind the United Kingdom in this progression.
Moreover, because of the new legislation against vulture funds, if FG
Hemisphere were to bring the Congo cases now against the DRC in London,
the English judge would agree with Beijing on the outcome of the case: the
vulture fund cannot recover the debt in full from the DRC.295 It appears that
Hong Kong judges, applying case law from over thirty years ago296 and
crippled by a total vacuum of statute297 (especially the absence of any new
legislation comparable to the Debt Relief Act of the United Kingdom), are not
equipped to properly deal with the new kind of lawsuits brought by vulture
funds.

289

Broomfield, supra note 101, at 505–06.
Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, 2010, c. 22 (U.K.).
291 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 (Permanent Effect) Order, 2011, S.I. 2011/1136,
explanatory note, (U.K.).
292 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, 2010, c. 22, explanatory note 4 (U.K.).
293 See Jones, supra note 288 (“Britain’s parliament has voted to ban so-called ‘vulture funds’ . . . .”);
Meirion Jones, Call for Jersey to Block $100m DR Congo ‘Vulture’ Debt, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15745003 (“ban on vulture funds”).
294 See, e.g., Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System
paras. 504–14 (C.F.A.) (H.K.) (Mortimer, J. dissenting); see also supra notes 16–40 and accompanying text.
295 There seem to be some conflicting interpretations of the U.K. statute. See, e.g., Broomfield, supra note
101, at 506–07 (“The Bill . . . would exclude debt incurred after the Bill became effective”). But see, e.g.,
Avery, supra note 104, at 282 (“As it currently stands, [vulture funds] are prohibited from litigating HIPCs
[(Highly Indebted Poor Countries)] in U.K. courts . . . .”). “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” includes the
DRC. Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act, 2010, c. 22, explanatory note 4 (U.K.).
296 See, e.g., Congo III, Legal Reference System paras. 504–14 (Mortimer, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 16–40 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
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When the Court of Appeal issued its judgment in favor of FG Hemisphere,
the Financial Times quoted a jurist calling this “a classic ‘vulture fund’
case.”298 The Congo cases epitomize the precarious situation frequently
contemplated in the literature on vulture funds. It takes only one uncooperative
vulture fund to stop investments in the debtor country. This forces the investor
doing business with the targeted debtor country to pay the vulture fund first
before paying the country, thus impeding economic development in the debtor
country.299
Unsurprisingly, there are certain facts in the Congo cases that the court
could not review or deemed immaterial, but may be of interest to legislators
and policy-makers. If one takes all these factual details into account, it
becomes evident that something more nuanced than a simple restrictive rule of
sovereign immunity may be necessary for lawsuits involving vulture funds. For
example, after Energoinvest finished the hydroelectric projects in the DRC in
the 1980s, both Yugoslavia and the DRC descended into years of civil war and
political chaos.300 Also, FG Hemisphere happened to initiate litigation a week
after the assassination of the DRC president, when six other countries invaded
the DRC, and when there was no functioning national government to represent
the DRC in the lawsuit.301
More embarrassing to the vulture plaintiff, after the Congo III case was
resolved in Hong Kong, investigative news reports appeared in the British
media showing improprieties associated with the sale of the arbital awards to
FG Hemisphere.302 One typical justification for the social utility of vulture
funds is that these litigious professional plaintiffs, by routinely examining the
commercial dealings of their target sovereign debtors, serve as a check on
corruption in developing countries.303 But in this instance, the vulture fund
may have instigated corruption. The British Broadcasting Corporation and the
Guardian newspaper reported that the then Prime Minister of Bosnia, Nedzad

298 Tom Mitchell & William Wallis, Hong Kong Court Ruling Hits Beijing’s Congo Hopes, FINANCIAL
TIMES (last updated Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/851d019c-209b-11df-9775-00144feab49a.
html#axzz26vmzFaer (quoting Akere Muna, a Cameroonian jurist).
299 See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
300 Reporter Greg Palast Exposes How U.S. “Vulture” Funds Make Millions by Exploiting African
Nations, DEMOCRACYNOW! (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/22/reporter_greg_
palast_exposes_how_us.
301 Id.
302 Jones, supra note 293.
303 See Broomfield, supra note 101, at 516–18; see also Peter Grossman, FG Hemisphere Associates
Responds to Inaccurate and Misleading Media Reports, FGHEM (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.fghem.com/.
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Brankovic, sold the Yugoslavian arbitral awards illegally to FG Hemisphere.304
Prime Minister Brankovic later resigned over corruption charges.305
The revelation of FG Hemisphere’s allegedly illegal deals with dubious
Bosnian politicians triggered a new round of public outcry in Britain against
vulture funds, putting the U.K. government under pressure to extend the Debt
Relief Act, which Parliament had already made permanent within the United
Kingdom,306 to offshore centers such as Jersey.307 After being in force for over
a year, the Debt Relief Act has garnered some considerable support in the
United Kingdom,308 and, therefore, it is probably here to stay. Seeing the
success of the Debt Relief Act, similar legislative measures against vulture
funds have been recommended for the United States.309
If restrictive sovereign immunity, plus the Debt Relief Act have worked for
the United Kingdom, one cannot see any reason why the same should not work
for Hong Kong. After all, much of Hong Kong’s law came from the United
Kingdom. If the Legislative Council of Hong Kong had the foresight to borrow
the Debt Relief Act from the United Kingdom and make it retroactively
applicable to the Congo III case, it might have been possible for Hong Kong to
retain its traditional common law position on sovereign immunity. Beijing
would probably be satisfied with an outcome where its African ally wins under
the new anti-vulture statute, and therefore it might be much less meddlesome.
Without Beijing’s intervention, the entire “constitutional crisis”310 surrounding
the Congo cases would perhaps never have happened. In other words, it seems
possible that a well-crafted statute limiting vulture activity in Hong Kong
304 Jones, supra note 293; Greg Palast et al., UK Urged to Prevent Vulture Funds Preying on World’s
Poorest Countries, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/nov/15/
call-action-vulture-funds-poor. FG Hemisphere has vehemently denied these news stories. Cf. Grossman,
supra note 303 (denying similar allegations).
305 Jones, supra note 293.
306 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 (Permanent Effect) Order, S.I. 2011/1136, explanatory
note, (U.K.); see also Mark Tran, Can Vulture Funds be Prevented from Preying on Poor Countries?,
GUARDIAN: POVERTY MATTERS BLOG, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/
nov/16/can-vulture-funds-be-prevented (last modified Nov. 16, 2011).
307 See, e.g., Greg Palast, et al., Vulture Funds Await Jersey Decision on Poor Countries’ Debts, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/nov/15/vulture-fundsjersey-decision; Jones, supra note 293.
308 Jones, supra note 293.
309 See Avery, supra note 105, at 280–89 (presenting arguments for passing a U.S. statute similar to the
British Debt Relief Act). But see Broomfield, supra note 101, at 508–27(arguing against statutes capping
vulture recovery).
310 Dem. Rep. Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. (Congo III), [2011] Legal Reference System para. 84
(C.F.A.) (H.K.).
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courts could have eliminated much, if not all, of the trouble the Congo cases
actually brought about.
CONCLUSION
About thirty years ago, two developing countries, Yugoslavia and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, entered into an agreement to build
hydroelectric projects.311 A decade later, both countries fell into civil war.312
Another decade later, a Bosnian politician of questionable character transferred
the old Yugoslavian deal to a group of New York investors known as a
“vulture fund.”313 Yet another decade later, the unfinished hydroelectric
business formed the basis of a landmark case on the abstract legal principle of
sovereign immunity in a former British colony in China.314 The circumstances
out of which the Congo cases arose have been so unpredictable. Little did
anyone know that a happy story of economic cooperation between two thirdworld countries would lead to a regression in a fundamental international law
principle in a far-away land.
Likewise, it will be a risky undertaking for anyone to predict the legacy of
the Congo cases. But after careful examination, this Comment reaches the
conclusion that the recent shift from restrictive to absolute sovereign immunity
in Hong Kong caused by the Congo III case will prove to be a regrettable step
in the wrong direction for Hong Kong, Mainland China, and the development
of customary international law. This Comment also proposes a solution to
undo the damage by the Congo III case.
For Hong Kong, a pioneer among common law jurisdictions applying
restrictive sovereign immunity, the shift to absolute immunity was a
regression, and thus impermissible under customary international law.315 Hong
Kong wrongfully reverted to the absolutist position that it had abandoned long
ago.316
For China, a self-proclaimed adherent to the absolute doctrine, the position
it reaffirmed in the Congo cases will not be tenable under the persistent
objector doctrine. China’s objection to the new restrictive doctrine of sovereign
311
312
313
314
315
316

See supra Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying note 300.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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immunity has not been persistent in the past,317 and it will likely be even less
persistent in the future. China’s signature to the UN Convention will
eventually force it to shift to restrictive immunity, and will bring back all the
challenges it dodged in the Congo cases, including the problems with vulture
funds.318 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the absolute rule will prove
detrimental to long-term Chinese interests, as it shuts the doors to Chinese
courts on private Chinese plaintiffs claiming against foreign sovereigns.319
For the development of international law, the regression in Hong Kong is a
step back against a prevailing trend, and therefore disrupted the formation of
restrictive sovereign immunity into a rule of customary international law.320 It
also failed to address the novel issue of vulture funds with any foresight, or in
any constructive way.321
Therefore, it is also the conclusion of this Comment that the mistake made
in the Congo case can and must be corrected. The shift to absolute sovereign
immunity should be reversed. But a simple rule of restrictive sovereign
immunity would not be sufficient by itself. To subdue vulture funds, specific
anti-vulture legislation should be applied. Adopting a U.K.-style statutory cap
on vulture recovery should be a good starting point for Hong Kong.322
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